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In cognitive psychology, studies concerning the face tend to focus on questions about face
recognition, theory of mind (ToM) and empathy. Questions about the face, however, also
fit into a very different set of issues that are central to ethics. Based especially on the
work of Levinas, philosophers have come to see that reference to the face of another
person can anchor conceptions of moral responsibility and ethical demand. Levinas points
to a certain irreducibility and transcendence implicit in the face of the other. In this paper
I argue that the notion of transcendence involved in this kind of analysis can be given a
naturalistic interpretation by drawing on recent interactive approaches to social cognition
found in developmental psychology, phenomenology, and the study of autism.
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INTRODUCTION
What I see in the other’s face is irreducible to its physiogomy, its
shape or morphological features, its color or physical properties.
The significance of the face transcends any of these things. This
is an insight associated with the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas
(1969). The other person, in her otherness, resists being simply an
entity—whether physical object or epistemological subject. The
other is not the sum total of her ontological parts, but in some
way transcends all of those parts. Nor is this transcendence simply
a way of pointing to something invisible, a mind or a set of mental
states that we might be able to infer or simulate. The other is not,
analogically, another me, or a set of mental states that are like
mine. Rather, Levinas suggests, the other, in her alterity, makes
an ethical demand on me, to which I am obligated to respond—
the face-to-face is primarily an ethical relation—the other’s face is
perceived as an obligation to respond.
For Levinas, ethics is not a matter of theory, argumentation
or the promulgation of rules, but is based on an experience
of transcendence encountered in the other’s face. The situation
in which I experience this transcendence is “when the face has
turned to me, in its very nakedness. It is by itself, and not by
reference to a system” (Levinas, 1969, p. 75). In this circumstance
the other’s vulnerability shines through her face, independent of
context, and elicits a response from me.
The face is characterized by proximity and distance at the same
time. When the other’s face is close to me, it is so not merely
in physical geographical terms, the way an instrument or artifact
might be. Its closeness demands a response that could range from
a passionate kiss to a punch, or some less extreme and more polite
behavior of moving away or asking for space. Even in contexts
that involve a close examination in scientific or medical terms,
the face demands some form of respect. Yet, even in its closeness
there is something distant in it since one’s experience of the other
is not just in terms of the physicality of the face. The face (or more
generally, the body) is never the totality of the other.
Although Levinas is in some respects a religious thinker
(Veling, 1999; Purcell, 2006), his ethics is not necessarily religious,
and his thinking about the face can be interpreted in secular terms
of embodied, and especially affective, intersubjective experience.
At least on one reading (Bergo, 2011), his ethical concept of
transcendence is not informed by his religious thought; it is rather
the other way around. Religious thinking may be motivated by the
transcendence encountered in our intersubjective relations. Ethics
begins in face-to-face experience and not in a theological dictum
or reference to God. At the same time, however, Levinas (1991)
associates the notion of transcendence indicated in the other’s
face with a form of infinity and as something beyond the reach of
science. It is something that is “beyond understanding” (déborde
la compréhension) (Levinas, 1991, p. 18).
What I want to demonstrate in this paper is that we can retain
this kind of ethical significance, this ineliminable and irreducible
transcendence of the other, as seen in the other’s face, and still
stand firmly on naturalistic grounds to gain an understanding
of its significance. Although I view Levinas as presenting an
important challenge to science and naturalistic philosophy, and
in that regard I want to take this challenge seriously, my argument
will not be in total agreement with Levinas. I’ll argue that the
transcendence at stake in this context involves one’s capacity to
perceive in the other the possibilities of further interactions that
have the potential to take one beyond oneself. The transcendence
isn’t just in the other; it’s in our possible interactions with the
other.
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INTERACTING WITH FACES
What is it about the other’s face, or more generally, about the
other, that elicits the ethical response? I want to work this out
in terms that relate to recent debates in social cognition—and
specifically in the context of embodied and enactive cognition.
In this regard, I will reject what may appear to be a rather easy
solution—an easy way to explain the transcendence of the other.
That is, I will reject the idea that what transcends the face is
the mind—the mental states (intentions, emotions, etc.) that
somehow may be physically expressed in facial expressions but
are themselves truly hidden and relatively transcendent, behind
or beyond physical expressions.
The idea that the mind is hidden away, and thus transcendent
to embodied comportment has been called the unobservability
principle (UP; Krueger, 2012, p. 149). Leslie (1987, p. 164) pro-
vides a clear statement of UP: “Because the mental states of others
(and indeed ourselves) are completely hidden from the senses,
they can only ever be inferred”. Many such statements of UP
can be found in the theory of mind (ToM) literature. Karmiloff-
Smith (1992, p. 138), for example, contends that ToM “involves
inferences based on unobservables (mental states, such as
belief)...” Or again, Johnson (2000, p. 22): “Mental states, and the
minds that possess them, are necessarily unobservable constructs
that must be inferred by observers rather than perceived directly”.
In opposition to ToM, however, phenomenologists have
argued against the supposed ubiquity of mindreading by
theoretical inference or simulation, and have defended an
embodied/enactive view that social understanding depends, in
large part, on interaction rather than on mindreading (Gallagher,
2001, 2005, 2012; Gallagher and Hutto, 2008; De Jaegher et al.,
2010). In interactive contexts direct perception also plays an
important role in social cognition (Gallagher, 2008); and one’s
perception of the other is often focused on the face. The argument
in favor of interaction theory (IT) has turned out to be a large,
complex, and controversial one. I will not try to provide the
entire story or enter into many of the details in this paper. Rather,
with a focus on the role of face perception, I will discuss some
of the experimental literature and its interpretations. Much of
the interpretation that we find in this literature is consistent
with UP and the ToM approach, and in this regard it follows
a common explanatory principle, namely, that social cognition
will ultimately be explained once we identify the process or
mechanism within the individual agent responsible for the
individual’s ability to understand the other. In contrast to this
principle, and consistent with interactionist views on social
cognition, I’ll argue that in basic (and most) instances social
cognition is accomplished by something that goes beyond the
individual agent, namely, the interaction itself. I’ll suggest that it is
in this interaction that we will be able to find an explanation of the
kind of transcendence discussed by Levinas in the ethical context.
My aim in this section is not to provide an exhaustive review
of the empirical literature on face perception, but to cover some
of the relevant research pertinent to a range of social-cognitive
experience. A good starting point is the research of Meltzoff and
Moore (1977, 1994) on neonate imitation. These well-known,
but still controversial experiments show that infants from birth
are typically able to interact with their caregivers, in a way that
privileges the face. Most of the experiments are on the imitation
of facial gestures, such as tongue protrusion, mouth opening,
and pursing of lips. But there are also experiments that show the
infant is able to imitate angular tongue protrusion, movement
of eyebrows, as well as smiles, grimaces, frowns, and so on (e.g.,
Field et al., 1982). We can note that one important aspect of these
findings is simply that infants are attracted to faces. To explain
this basic fact, Meltzoff and Moore (1997) propose an explanation
in terms of a cross-modal mechanism. Faces are attractive and
meaningful to infants because what the infant sees is generally
isomorphic to own felt experiences. The cross-modal integration
of vision and proprioception allows the infant to make some kind
of pragmatic sense of the other’s expression, in a way that calls
forth a response (see Gallagher and Meltzoff, 1996), or as Meltzoff
and Moore (1997) put it, it calls forth an action which serves
the specific purpose that the infant is able to employ imitation
to verify the identity of others.
There are disagreements about whether this kind of response is
genuine imitation, or whether it’s the result of perceptual priming
in a system with underdeveloped inhibitory mechanisms, or sim-
ply a form of contagion (see, e.g., Hurley and Chater, 2004). There
are, accordingly, disagreements about the nature of the activity
and the nature of the mechanisms to be found in the infant that
would account for their ability. Without settling these kinds of
disagreements, proponents of IT consider neonate imitation to
be part of “primary intersubjectivity” (Trevarthen, 1979), and,
regardless of how it is explained or what internal mechanism is
involved, its significance is primarily that it is a very early process
that pulls the infant into a dyadic and dynamic interaction with
the other. One can set aside questions about whether the infant is
conscious of what it is doing, or whether internal representations
are involved, or whether it’s a strictly automatic response that
comes down to mirror neuron activation, and still see that the
significance of the infant’s response to the other’s face is tied to
the fact that it is not a one-way process. The adult initiates the
process in a way that elicits the infant’s response and establishes
an interaction that is two-way or reciprocal. The infant comes to
be enactively coupled to the other in this interaction. The idea of
enactive coupling means, in this context, that (1) it is a dynamic
process (i.e., one in which a co-dependence is established between
the coupled systems such that what happens in or to one system
is partly dependent on the situation of the other); (2) that the
recurrent engagement with the other person leads to a structural
congruence between self and other (Thompson, 2007, p. 45);
and (3) that the engaging organisms (or agents) maintain their
autonomy (their own internal self-organization).1 Accordingly,
although one can still talk of individuals who engage in the
interaction, a full account of neonate imitation is not reducible to
mechanisms at work in either or both of the individuals. Complex
coordination patterns that result from the mutual interaction of
a social encounter, as such, are not simply inputs to individual
mechanisms (De Jaegher et al., 2010). Such coordination pro-
cesses can acquire a momentum of their own and can pull the
participants into further or continuing interaction. Interaction in
1See Di Paolo and De Jaegher (2012) for a more formal account of dynamic
coupling.
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intersubjective contexts goes beyond each participant; it results
in something (the creation of meaning) that goes beyond what
each individual qua individual, that is, on its own, can bring to
the process.2
Tracking and discriminating faces are some of the earliest
infant capacities (Stern, 1985; Johnson et al., 1991; Walton et al.,
1992; Hendricks-Jansen, 1996; Mondloch et al., 1999; Bushnell,
2001). Faces have saliency, not only for newborn infants, but
throughout the life span, and many, if not most of our inter-
actions with others are conducted face-to-face where enactive
coupling is the rule, and where interaction itself is enabling
and sometimes constitutive of social cognition. Developmental
studies indicate the continued importance of faces. We know
that infants “vocalize and gesture in a way that seems [affectively
and temporally] ‘tuned’ to the vocalizations and gestures of the
other person” (Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997, p. 131) and that “in
the gentle, immediate, affectionate, and rhythmically regulated
playful exchanges of proto-conversation, 2-month-old infants
look at the eyes and mouth of the person addressing them while
listening to the voice” (Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001, p. 6). This
has been dramatically demonstrated in still face experiments
(Tronick et al., 1978) where the animation of the other’s face
is shown to be absolutely essential to the interaction process.
The advent of joint attention (sometime during the first year—
see Reddy, 2008), “secondary intersubjectivity” (Trevarthen and
Hubley, 1978), as well as social referencing (Klinnert et al., 1983;
Mumme et al., 1996) all depend on making visual contact with
the face of the other.
Eye-tracking studies and our everyday phenomenology attest
to the fact that the importance of the perception of the other’s gaze
for a grasp of intentions and emotions continues in adulthood.
We see meaning and emotion in the faces of others. Phenomenol-
ogists have noted this often in their criticisms of the UP.
I do not see anger . . . as a psychic fact hidden behind the gesture
. . .. The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself.
. . . I perceive the grief or the anger of the other in his conduct, in
the face or his hands, without recourse to any “inner experience”
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002, pp. 214, 415).
Anger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden at the
bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behavior or
styles of conduct which are visible from the outside. They exist on
this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964, pp. 52–53).
As Merleau-Ponty understands the notion of behavior, it is
not a meaningless set of movements that require us to make
inferences beyond what we can see. Behavior is meaningful, and
what we can see is the meaning and the intention in the actions
and expressions of others. Accordingly, this is not a form of
psychological behaviorism. The phenomenologists are not alone
in this. Consider that Wittgenstein, a philosopher from a very
different tradition, says much the same thing.
2As Di Paolo et al. (2008) put it, “interaction can dynamically create phenom-
ena that do not directly result from the individual capacities or behaviors of
any of the partners if investigated on their own” (p. 279).
Look into someone else’s face, and see the consciousness in it,
and a particular shade of consciousness. You see on it, in it,
joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor, and so on.. . . Do
you look into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face?
(Wittgenstein, 1967, §229). [I]t is as if the human face were in a
way translucent and that I were seeing it not in reflected light but
rather in its own (Wittgenstein, 1980, §170).
In intersubjective contexts, visual perception of the face of the
other is not equivalent to glancing at an object. It’s not a matter
of me seeing the other’s face, simpliciter, but of seeing that the
other sees me (or quiet literally, seeing the other seeing me). The
fact that the other returns the gaze, and that this strongly registers
in our perception (cf. Sartre, 1956; Stawarska, 2009), provides
part of the basis for regarding the other not as mere object but
as a perceiving subject—and carries with it ethical significance.
The other’s gaze is precisely not something that can be subsumed
into a strictly visual representation of eye direction since it has an
affective impact on my own system that sets me up for further
response. Perception of another’s face activates not just the face
recognition area and ventral pathway, but also the dorsal visual
pathway—suggesting that we perceive affordances for possible
responsive actions in the face of the other (Debruille et al., 2012).
Faced with the face of a real person, at a minimum, subjects
make eye contact with very subtle eye movements. Accordingly,
face perception presents not just objective patterns that we might
recognize as emotions. It involves complex interactive behavioral
and response patterns arising out of an active engagement with
the other’s face—not a simple recognition of facial features—
but an interactive perception that constitutes the recognition of
emotions.3
It’s a mistake, of course, to take the face as an isolated entity,
or to think that face-based emotion recognition is informationally
encapsulated (pace Goldman, 2006, p. 110), even if in many cases
we focus on the face in everyday life. We rely on a variety of
bodily aspects in social interaction—posture, movement, gesture,
vocal intonation and prosody—as well as communicative and
narrative practices (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008), place-related and
contextual factors, background knowledge about the person, etc.
and our own prior experience. In this regard, we can also say
that some of what is true of perception in general also applies
to face perception. For example, meaningful perception of any
sort may rely on activation of association brain areas outside of
very early perceptual processing areas, like visual cortex V1. But
recent research shows that even neuronal activity in the earliest of
perceptual processing areas, such as V1, reflects more than simple
feature detection. E.g., V1 neurons anticipate reward if they have
been relevantly attuned by prior experience (Shuler and Bear,
2006). What we see in the present, including faces, incorporates
an affective sense of relevant past experiences, so that reportable
visual perception is already informed with affective value from the
3If we think of emotions as complex patterns of experiences and behaviors—
and as such as “individuated in patterns of characteristic features”—features
that may include bodily expressions, behaviors, action expressions, etc., then
emotion perception can be considered a form of pattern recognition (Izard,
1972; Izard et al., 2000; Newen et al., in press). In this regard, the facial
expressions play a major role.
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start. Barrett and Bar’s affective prediction hypothesis “implies that
responses signaling an object’s salience, relevance or value do not
occur as a separate step after the object is identified. Instead, affec-
tive responses support vision from the very moment that visual
stimulation begins” (Barrett and Bar, 2009, p. 1325). Along with
the earliest visual processing, the medial orbital frontal cortex is
activated and initiates a train of muscular and hormonal changes
throughout the body, “interoceptive sensations” from organs,
muscles, and joints associated with prior experience, which are
integrated with current exteroceptive sensory information that
help to guide response and subsequent actions. Accordingly, along
with the perception of the environment, we also undergo and pos-
sibly experience, more or less recessively, certain bodily affective
changes that accompany this integrated processing (Barrett and
Bar, 2009, p. 1326). In other words, before we fully recognize an
object or a face, for what it is, our bodies are already configured
into overall peripheral and autonomic patterns based on prior
associations. In terms of the predictive coding model used by
Barrett and Bar, priors are not just in the brain, but involve a
whole body adjustment.
Disruptions to intersubjective interaction and to emotional
attunement can equally enlighten us about the nature of social
cognition. If a facial expression contradicts other interactive or
communicative processes, for example, if an actor shows happy
facial gestures while telling a sad story (Decety and Chaminade,
2003), the result is puzzlement, distrust, and more explicit
attempts to figure out motivations. If perception of the emotion
pattern on the face is disrupted, intersubjective problems develop.
While most people perceive the face or body of another as a
familiar whole imbued with life, subjectivity, and expression,
schizophrenia patients will sometimes focus on individual parts
or the purely material aspect of the person before them (see
Addington and Addington, 1998; Sass and Pienkos, 2013).
As a result, in such instances of schizophrenia (as well as
in autism), subjects have a propensity to view the face as an
array of unrelated details; they miss the pattern/gestalt and fail
to recognize the emotion.
In cases of Möbius Syndrome (MS)—a form of congenital
bilateral facial paralysis resulting from developmental problems
with the sixth and seventh cranial nerves (Briegel, 2006)—
subjects lack the capacity for facial expression and full control
of eye movements. These physical problems can lead to diffi-
culties with social understanding and behavior. Some subjects
with MS manifest traits of social inhibition, introversion, feelings
of social inadequacy and inferiority (Briegel, 2007) and report
feeling out of sync with others (Cole, 1999b; Cole and Spalding,
2009). Indeed, part of the problem in MS is not in MS itself,
but in the regard of others and in interactions between people
with MS and others. Because facial expressions play a large role
in intersubjective interaction, we anticipate facial responses and
when they do not occur (as in MS) interaction can be disrupted
in terms of its dynamics and affectivity, leading to confusion or
feelings of social discomfort. This does not rule out the possibility
that people with MS can find alternative strategies for interacting
and understanding others (as Krueger and Michael, 2012 argue),4
but it does highlight the importance of facial expressions for social
cognition.
Face-related problems with intersubjective interaction are also
to be found in cases of blindness (both congenital and acquired),
those on the autism spectrum who actively avoid looking at faces,
those with facial disfigurements or Parkinson’s Disease. Jonathan
Cole (1999a) gives an excellent account of these conditions with
respect to the social difficulties that come along with them. Cole
also takes us back to issues raised by Levinas.
If face-to-face relationships involve feelings toward and between
people, any external face, another’s face, puts a demand on me. It
asks me to recognize another, for what I cannot fully assimilate I
must respect, and for Levinas this recognition summons me to a
form of moral responsibility, in the face of the other, which cannot
be brought under the control of my reason and therefore cannot
be explained. This moral or ethical responsibility can be viewed in
terms of the need for a response, for the face of the other requires
me to respond and enter into a relationship, but a relationship
that I cannot fully control, that neither of us can fully control. It
involves a risk so evident for many of those with facial problems
that they avoid it (Cole, 1999a, p. 196).
ABOUT FACE: RESPONDING TO LEVINAS
It’s clear from the various empirical studies cited above that, as
Krueger and Michael (2012) so aptly put it, “the face is the center
of gravity for our social interactions” Krueger and Michael (2012,
p. 4). But there is also something that seemingly floats free of a
purely physical science. Levinas insists on transcendence. For him,
I experience transcendence “when the face has turned to me, in its
very nakedness. It is by itself, and not by reference to a system”
(Levinas, 1969, p. 75). Levinas associates war with the concept
of totality (a complete system, the opposite of a never complete
infinity) and a denial of morality: “War renders morality derisory”
(Levinas, 1969, p. 21). In this regard it is notable that the face
of the other in battle has profound inhibitory effects on violent
behavior directed towards the other (Grossman, 1996; Protevi,
2008). Killing involves an objectification (or de-subjectification)
of the other in practices that include covering or ignoring the
other’s face. In this particular context, the denial of the face
signifies that the other is reduced to a complete system which
excludes the possibility of any further interaction. One finds this
same denial, a closing down of interaction possibilities, in cases
of torture and solitary confinement (Guenther, 2013; Gallagher,
2014).
4I’m in favor of a pluralist approach to social cognition (Fiebich, 2012), which
does not deny that we can use some form of theoretical inference or simulation
(see Gallagher, 2001), as well as narrative and communicative practices to
gain understanding of others (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008). Pace Krueger
and Michael (2012), I do not deny such possibilities. I do think, however,
there is significant behavioral and phenomenological evidence to suggest
that most of our everyday encounters with others are primarily embodied
interactions, including communicative interactions, and that third-person
theoretical inference and simulation are exceptional rather than common. I
note also that I’m not at all convinced that a reverse simulation model as a
form of mimicry can be thought of as “endorsing” what Krueger and Michael
(2012) call strong interaction theory, as they claim.
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I want to suggest, along with Levinas (1969), and adopting
his terms, that “infinity is produced in the relationship of the
same with the other” (Levinas, 1969, p. 26). But this means that
there is nothing about the face in itself, solus ipse, or on its
own, that generates the ethical demand. Nor is there anything
like a complete alterity of the other that is not already mediated
in interaction; much of what I am is already shaped in my
interactions with others. Levinas emphasizes the asymmetrical
demand of the other on me (e.g., Levinas, 1969, p. 46). Yet, we
could think that the ethical demand is generated in the mutual
turning towards each other. What is important is that the other
looks back at me, as I meet her gaze with my own—this mutual
experience, which is an aspect of primary intersubjectivity, sparks
an interaction between me and the other. The transcendence
associated with the ethical is not something unreachable in the
other, but is generated in the interaction that transcends all
individuality.
The most basic and primary experience of the other is this face-
to-face, which sets in play the interaction and the transcendence—
an interaction that transcends the individuals involved and
requires a response that is never complete. The meaning that
emerges or is established by the interaction calls for further
interpretation, interaction or communication. The ethical, which
is about our way of living with others, is built around this
primary intersubjective experience—and around it we start to
build certain practices.
Interactionists sometimes use the metaphor of the tango (e.g.,
Di Paolo et al., 2013). Just as it takes two to tango, one cannot
accomplish interaction by oneself. Just as when two people dance
the tango, something dynamic is created that neither one could
create on one’s own. One might think that the metaphor of
the tango involves an overly formal structure and that perhaps
something more like a free dance form is more appropriate for
how the dynamics of interaction work. But most of our lives are
lived within social and intersubjective structures (practices and
institutions) that do specify how we relate to one another. In
some cases this takes the shape of a norm or rule that requires
that we mutually recognize our responsibility to the other. Even
within such structures, however, even in those that may support
totalizing practices, but perhaps short of war, torture, and solitary
confinement, one can find the possibility of transcendence in face-
to-face relationships. In that interaction there is a mutual expec-
tation of response, and an expectation that we will continue the
interaction to some defined or perhaps ill-defined and imperfect
end.
Levinas is right about the face, and about its irreducibility;
but the other’s face is not an absolute alterity, nor does it lead us
beyond what we can find in our daily interactions.
On the one hand, in this realm (and clearly in the realm of
some institutions) there are no guarantees that we find the kind
of transcendence that Levinas talks about. On the other hand, the
transcendence that may be found in interactions can open up
a vista of possibilities—possibilities of further interactions that
have the potential to take me beyond myself, and that make the
other incalculably significant, someone I turn away from at my
own risk.
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